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The Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial1 has ancient
origins in the Assize of Clarendon (1166)2 and in the Magna
Carta (1215).' Many of the American colonies also recognized the
right to a speedy trial.4 With such a venerable history, one would
expect the speedy trial right to be as fundamental and extensive
a guarantee as any of the other constitutionally recognized rights
of the accused, such as the right to be secure against unreason-
able searches and seizures5 or the right not to be compelled to
incriminate oneself.' Unfortunately, history has not played out
in such a predictable fashion.
In theory, the right to a speedy trial is "fundamental."7
However, because the right is so "amorphous," "slippery,"' and
generally difficult to vindicate,9 courts have not applied a consis-
tent legal standard in speedy trial cases. Indeed, federal appel-
late courts' speedy trial rulings throughout this century have
portrayed the right as somehow less fundamental and more
contingent than other procedural safeguards in the Bill of
t A.B. 1991, Harvard University; J.D. Candidate 1994, The University of Chicago.
1 "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial... ." US Const, Amend VI.
2 See David C. Douglas and George W. Greenway, eds, 2 English Historical Docu-
ments 408 (Oxford, 1953).
' In the Magna Carta, King John provided that "we will not... defer to any man ei-
ther justice or right." Id, citing Magna Carta, c 29 (1215).
' See Alfredo Garcia, The Sixth Amendment in Modern American Jurisprudence 159
(Greenwood, 1992) (The states recognizing some form of speedy trial right in 1776 includ-
ed Virginia, Delawpre, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania.).
' US Const, Amend IV. See, for example, Mapp v Ohio, 367 US 643, 649 (1961),
citing McNabb v United States, 318 US 332, 339-401 (1943) (emphasizing the fundamental
character of the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures).
c US Const, Amend V. See, for example, Massiah v United States, 377 US 201, 204-
05 (1964) (noting that certain aspects of a defendant's right against self-incrimination are
fundamental).
Klopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213, 223 (1967).
Barker v Wingo, 407 US 514, 522 (1972).
See Gregory P.N. Joseph, Speedy Trial Rights in Application, 48 Fordham L Rev
611, 612 (1980).
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Rights. ° This treatment reflects the orthodoxy that the right to
a speedy trial is the one criminal procedural guarantee in the
Constitution that must be limited by the countervailing demands
of "public justice."" In other words, courts have typically
held-and most academic commentators have agreed-that the
Sixth Amendment provides relief for defendants suffering from
trial delays only where society lacks a countervailing interest in
continuing to hold them for trial. 2
In Barker v Wingo, the Supreme Court attempted to bring
some order to speedy trial jurisprudence by establishing a test for
evaluating speedy trial claims. 3 The Barker test-which re-
quires courts to balance four factors-namely, the length of the
delay, the reason for the delay, when the defendant asserted his
right to speedy trial, and the prejudice suffered by the defendant
as a result of the delay-represented no radical innovation in
speedy trial jurisprudence, but was rather a consolidation of
various tests already in force in the lower courts. Still, lower
courts have divided sharply in their interpretations of the test.
Some courts have given the four Barker factors equal weight,
while others believe that the fourth factor-prejudice to the
defendant-is of primary importance.
This Comment argues that both these interpretations depend
on the flawed premise that society and individual defendants
have inherently conflicting interests in the speed with which a
defendant is brought to trial. In fact, existing interpretations of
the Barker test disserve the interests that have been identified
during the development of speedy trial law. In response, this
Comment proposes a different approach: a "motive test" which
focuses attention on the reason for trial delays. Such an inquiry
would most effectively and consistently vindicate the speedy trial
interests of both society and the accused.
Although most speedy trial problems today arise under
either the federal Speedy Trial Act or state speedy trial statutes,
"0 Prior to Klopfer, where the Supreme Court first called the speedy trial right
"fundamental," the leading book on the Sixth Amendment stated that a speedy trial was
.a privilege rather than a right." Francis H. Heller, The Sixth Amendment 61 (Kansas,
1951).
" This characterization first appeared in Beavers v Haubert, 198 US 77, 87 (1905),
which noted that the right to a speedy trial does not "preclude the rights of public justice."
2 This proposition is perhaps best established by the fact that most claims for speedy
trial relief are denied. The paradigm case for granting speedy trial relief is probably
Doggett v United States, 112 S Ct 2686 (1992), where the petitioner, whose trial had been
delayed more than 8 years, appeared to have completely reformed himself.
13 407 US 514, 530 (1972).
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this Comment focuses exclusively on those instances in which a
defendant seeks constitutional relief. The failure of the federal
courts to develop a constitutional speedy trial test that works has
given rise to these statutory remedies. Unfortunately for criminal
defendants, the Speedy Trial Act is primarily designed to protect
the government's interests in a speedy trial.'4 This Comment
argues for a revival of the constitutional remedy in order that
defendants may have a meaningful right to a speedy trial.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPEEDY TRIAL JURISPRUDENCE:
BEAVERS TO BARKER
Until relatively recently, the right to a speedy criminal trial
was practically a cipher among the personal guarantees of the
Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court and the federal circuit courts
generally did not enforce the right because they lacked a well-
developed means of assessing whether a defendant had been
denied a speedy trial." Furthermore, the Court did not hold the
guarantee of a speedy trial applicable to the states until 1967.16
Before Barker v Wingo, lower courts that did endorse the policy
objectives of the speedy trial right used meaningfully different
methods to determine when the government had failed to provide
a speedy trial. 7 As one commentator noted, the speedy trial
guarantee remained a "protean right" until the Supreme Court enun-
ciated a legal test in 1972.18
The Supreme Court first considered the speedy trial guaran-
tee in the 1905 case of Beavers v Haubert.9 Defendant Beavers
faced two separate criminal indictments, one in New York and
one in the District of Columbia. The prosecutor in New York
opted not to proceed with his case against Beavers and decided
instead to initiate proceedings to remove Beavers to the District
of Columbia for trial. Beavers objected that postponing the trial
of his charges in New York violated his Sixth Amendment right
See text accompanying notes 84-90.
" See Barker, 407 US at 515-16 (remarking that "in none of these [prior] cases have
we attempted to set out the criteria by which the speedy trial right is to be judged").
Klopfer, 386 US at 223.
17 See, for example, United States v Stamp, 458 F2d 759, 769 (DC Cir 1971) (balanc-
ing four Barker-like factors but considering the reason for delay only to the extent the
delay was "purposeful"); United States v Aberson, 419 F2d 820, 821 (2d Cir 1970) (holding
that defendant's assertion of the right is an absolute prerequisite to a speedy trial claim);
United States v Booz, 451 F2d 719, 926 (3d Cir 1971) (holding that time is the most
important element in the speedy trial balance).
8 See Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 Va L Rev 1587, 1618 (1965).
19 198 US 77 (1905).
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to a speedy trial. The Supreme Court rejected Beavers's claim. In
an opinion that decisively shaped the speedy trial debate, the
Court stated that the right to a speedy trial is neither "unquali-
fied" nor "absolute," that the right "does not preclude the rights
of public justice," and most importantly, that the right is "neces-
sarily relative," "consistent with delays and depend[ent] upon
circumstances."2"
Scholars have roundly criticized the Court's premise in
Beavers that defendants' interests in the speedy trial are opposed
to society's interests.2' Nonetheless, over the next sixty years a
strong consensus developed in the courts that the speedy trial
right was more amenable to interest-balancing than other proce-
dural protections. Federal courts after Beavers identified several
interests underlying the Sixth Amendment. These interests in-
cluded: providing incentives for diligence on the part of defense
counsel, prosecutors, and defendants;2 discouraging purposeful
or oppressive imprisonment prior to trial;' ensuring the "order-
ly expedition and not mere speed" of the judicial process;" and
preventing actual prejudice to the accused.
By the late 1960s, discussions of these numerous policy goals
had completely taken over speedy trial jurisprudence. Both the
lower courts and the academic literature advocated balancing
tests that could capture all the diverse policy objectives of the
speedy trial right.26 The Supreme Court heeded their calls when
it devised the Barker test.
20 Id at 86-87.
2 See, for example, H. Richard Uviller, Barker v. Wingo: Speedy Trial Gets a Fast
Shuffle, 72 Colum L Rev 1376, 1378-80 (1972); Garcia, The Sixth Amendment at 157 (cited
in note 4). Uviller argues that the Beavers premise (as endorsed in Barker) is wrong
because all the criminal procedural guarantees in the Bill of Rights are intended to
protect defendants' rights against the government; all these guarantees thus compete
with societal interests. 72 Colum L Rev at 1378.
' Hedgepeth v United States, 364 F2d 684, 687 (DC Cir 1966). See also Dickey v
Florida, 398 US 30, 38 (1970) (calling delay impermissible when merely for the conve-
nience of the government).
' United States v Ewell, 383 US 116, 120 (1966); Pollard v United States, 352 US
354, 361 (1957). See also Williams v United States, 250 F2d 19, 21 (DC Cir 1957) (holding
that the government should lose the right to prosecute if the imprisoned defendant has
suffered delay attributable to factors other than the "ordinary processes of justice").
24 Ewell, 383 US at 120, citing Smith v United States, 360 US 1, 10 (1959).
Williams, 250 F2d at 21; Hedgepeth, 364 F2d at 687.
See, for example, United States v Mann, 291 F Supp 268, 270 (S D NY 1968); Note,
The Right to a Speedy Trial, 20 Stan L Rev 476, 478-82 (1968). Both Mann and the
Stanford Law Review Note suggest a four-pronged balancing test, taking into account the
length oftrial delay, the reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted the right
to a speedy trial, and any actual prejudice suffered by the defendant.
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In Barker, the Court purported to resolve the question of how
to determine a denial of a defendant's right to a speedy trial.
Willie Barker was arrested for murder in Kentucky in July of
1958. In an effort to delay Barker's trial pending the conviction of
an accomplice (whose testimony was considered crucial to the
case against Barker), the prosecution moved for a total of sixteen
continuances. Eventually, Barker was convicted in October of
1963, largely on the strength of the accomplice's testimony. More
than five years had passed between Barker's arrest and his con-
viction. State appellate courts denied Barker's speedy trial claim,
and the lower federal courts rejected his habeas corpus plea. The
Sixth Circuit ruled that Barker had waived his Sixth Amend-
ment rights by failing to object until after the prosecution's
twelfth motion for continuance.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide what criteria
should be used to determine whether a defendant's speedy trial
right has been violated.2 ' The Court then adopted a four-
pronged balancing test taking into account the "[1]ength of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right,
and prejudice to the defendant." 29
In establishing this balancing test, the Court explicitly re-
jected two possible bright-line rules: one based solely on the
length of delay, the other based solely on defendant's failure to
demand a speedy trial."0 The Court argued that the speedy trial
guarantee required a balancing approach rather than a bright-
line rule because the guarantee differs from other constitutional
rights in three significant respects. First, the speedy trial right is
more vague than other procedural rights. Second, the deprivation
of the right can at times work to the accused's advantage. Third,
the speedy trial right protects both the defendant's fair trial
interests and the public's interest in an efficient system of jus-
tice.31 As the Court noted, "In addition to the general concern
that all accused persons be treated according to decent and fair
procedures, there is a societal interest in providing a speedy trial
which exists separate from, and at times in opposition to, the in-
terests of the accused." 2
27 Barker, 407 US at 515-19. See also Barker v Wingo, 442 F2d 1141, 1143 (6th Cir
1971).
2 407 US at 516.
2 Id at 530.
30 Id at 523-28.
31 Id at 519-22.
3 Id at 519.
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The Barker Court stated:
We regard none of the four factors.., as either a necessary
or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the
right of speedy trial. Rather, they are related factors and
must be considered together with such other circumstances
as may be relevant. In sum, these factors have no talismanic
qualities; courts must still engage in a difficult and sensitive
balancing process.3
Despite the seeming simplicity of this admonition, lower courts
have not settled on the proper interpretation of the Barker test.
Thus, although Barker sought to clarify how the courts were to
handle speedy trial claims-and although the Court effectively
ratified the balancing approach already popular among courts
and commentators 34 -Barker introduced more confusion than
clarity to speedy trial jurisprudence.
II. DIFFERING FORMULATIONS OF THE BARKER TEST
The Second, Third, Sixth, and D.C. Circuits have adopted
what might be called a "straight" balancing approach to speedy
trial claims. 5 Under this approach, courts give equal weight to
all four Barker factors. The length of delay is often the critical
factor in these cases. Indeed, a prejudicial delay is often consid-
ered a threshold requirement to the balancing inquiry." But
after enough of a prejudicial delay has been established to allow
the claim to go forward, the length of the delay is still balanced
with the other factors to achieve the proper result.37 Under
these cases, any construction of Barker capable of mitigating very
long trial delays should therefore be rejected. The Sixth Amend-
ment, after all, assumes that "unreasonable delays are by their
'9 Id at 533.
' Fifteen years earlier, a law review note cited three of the four Barker factors as al-
ready being firmly entrenched in the law of speedy trials. Note, The Right to a Speedy
Criminal Trial, 57 Colum L Rev 846, 851-58 (1957). See, for example, United States v Fay,
313 F2d 620, 623 (2d Cir 1963); Buatte v United States, 350 F2d 389, 394 (9th Cir 1965);
United States v Parrot, 248 F Supp 196, 202 (D DC 1965); United States v Penn, 267 F
Supp 912, 913 (E D La 1967).
" See Garcia Montalvo v United States, 862 F2d 425, 426 (2d Cir 1988) (per curiam);
United States v Blanco, 861 F2d 773 (2d Cir 1988); Hakeem v Beyer, 990 F2d 750, 759-72
(3d Cir 1993); United States v White, 985 F2d 271, 275-76 (6th Cir 1993); United States v
Gerald, 5 F3d 563 (DC Cir 1993).
31 See, for example, Blanco, 861 F2d at 777, citing United States v Loud Hawk, 474
US 302, 314 (1986).
" Blanco, 861 F2d at 777.
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nature prejudicial."" Thus, even when, for instance, a defendant
cannot show prejudice, the straight balancing test holds open the
possibility of a Sixth Amendment violation.
In contrast to this "straight" balancing approach, and possi-
bly in violation of Barker's requirement to balance all four factors
equally,39 the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted more of
a "weighted" balancing test to better serve what they consider to
be the policy goals of Barker.40 While these courts view Barker
as providing a remedy for defendants who are measurably
harmed by a delay, they allow prosecutors a wide degree of lati-
tude as long as the defendant cannot show actual prejudice. A
defendant must either show actual prejudice or show that all
three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the government
to make out a successful speedy trial claim.4'
Thus, while the straight balancing approach considers all
four factors (and thus allows any one factor, if sufficiently
egregious, to require a reversal), the weighted balancing ap-
proach assigns a particularly heavy emphasis to the defendant's
ability to show actual prejudice to his defense (often making such
a finding indispensable to a successful speedy trial claim). The
test is typically described in this way: "[Because] only two of the
first three Barker factors weighed heavily against the govern-
ment, the defendants were reqaired to show actual prejudice."'
' This proposition was demonstrated most clearly in Garcia Montalvo, 862 F2d at
426, where the court acknowledged its obligation to consider the length and reason for the
trial delay even where the defendant completely failed to show any particular prejudice.
' Barker, 407 US at 533 ("We regard none of the four factors.., as either a neces-
sary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right to a speedy trial.").
40 See Hill v Wainwright, 617 F2d 375, 379 n 4 (5th Cir 1980); Ringstaff v Howard,
885 F2d 1542, 1543 (11th Cir 1989).
4 The clearest case on this point is United States u Mitchell, 769 F2d 1544, 1547
(11th Cir 1985), which states: "[T]he settled rule in this circuit is that unless the first
three Barker factors all weigh heavily against the government, the defendants must
demonstrate actual prejudice." Other cases frame the test in the obverse: if the first three
factors weigh heavily against the government, then actual prejudice need not be shown.
See Hill, 617 F2d at 379 n 4; Ringstaff, 885 F2d at 1543; United States v Dennard, 722
F2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir 1984).
42 The Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits have also indicated some affinity for this
weighted balancing approach. See United States v Koller, 956 F2d 1408, 1415 (7th Cir
1992) (holding that, although only the reason-for-delay factor weighed in favor of the
government, no speedy trial relief could be granted because actual prejudice did not weigh
heavily enough in the defendant's favor); United States v Mehrmanesh, 652 F2d 766, 769
(9th Cir 1980) (stating that Barker "labeled the last interest [prejudice] as the most
important"); United States v Martinez, 776 F2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir 1985) (holding that
"in the absence of prejudice, we have great reluctance to dismiss an indictment for prose-
cutorial delay").
43 Mitchell, 769 F2d at 1547.
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In other words, if the first three factors-length of delay, reason
for delay, and defendant's assertion of his right-weigh heavily
against the government, no showing of actual prejudice is re-
quired. As in the straight balancing cases, these courts often
regard the length of delay as a "triggering mechanism"; the
speedy trial guarantee does not come into play unless the delay
is greater than a certain amount of time.' But, at least until
recently, once the delay passed this threshold, under the weight-
ed approach, these courts did not inquire further into the length
of delay.45 This approach may account for the fact that delays as
long as eight years have failed to elicit speedy trial relief in juris-
dictions applying the weighted balancing test.46
The Supreme Court took its most recent look at the speedy
trial guarantee in Doggett v United States.' Doggett was in-
dicted in February 1980 for several drug-related federal offenses.
Because Doggett was then living in Bogota, Colombia, federal law
enforcement officers could not directly pursue him, but they did
enter his name into several major criminal databases and the
INTERPOL lookout system. In September 1981, the federal agent
in charge of the search for Doggett discovered that Doggett had
been arrested on drug charges in Panama. Doggett was released
from Panamanian custody in July 1982, a fact that the U.S. em-
bassy in-Panama cabled to the State Department. Nonetheless,
Customs officials in New York City admitted Doggett to the Unit-
ed States. For the next six years, federal officials made almost no
effort to locate Doggett until, as a result of a routine credit check,
Doggett was discovered by police and arraigned on the outstand-
ing drug charges. Doggett, who by this time had married and was
employed as a computer operations manager, objected to the
arraignment on speedy trial grounds. The Eleventh Circuit up-
held his conviction, relying primarily on Doggett's failure to dem-
onstrate that the delay had prejudiced his ability to defend in
1988 against drug charges filed in 1980."8
4 See, for example, Hill, 617 F2d at 378 (stating that a delay of "three years serves
as a 'triggering mechanism' to invoke [any] further analysis").
" See, for example, id at 377-78. The Supreme Court dealt with this problem in
Doggett v United States, 112 S Ct 2686, 2690-91 (1992), where the length of delay factor
was held to require a "double enquiry," viewing length first as a triggering mechanism
and then as an equal factor in the balancing test. Even so, the weighted balancing test is
still less likely to result in relief than a test that considers all the factors equally.
46 See Bell v Lynaugh, 828 F2d 1085 (5th Cir 1987).
47 112 S Ct 2686 (1992).
4 Doggett v United States, 906 F2d 573, 580-82 (11th Cir 1990).
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In an opinion by Justice Souter, the Supreme Court reversed
the Eleventh Circuit. The opinion did not, however, address
whether the lower court had erred by applying a weighted bal-
ancing test, requiring Doggett to show actual prejudice. Rather,
the Court held that the Eleventh Circuit had incorrectly deter-
mined that the reason for delay in Doggett's case did not weigh
against the government.49 In other words, Doggett was decided
primarily on the lower court's misapplication of the weighted bal-
ancing test, not on the grounds that the weighted balancing ap-
proach is an invalid interpretation of Barker.
In failing to pass on the validity of the weighted balancing
test, Doggett exacerbated the confusion that had developed over
the proper application of the Barker test. For example, the Ninth
Circuit has interpreted Doggett as eliminating a previous require-
ment that actual prejudice be shown.5 ° By contrast, a district
court in the Western District of Missouri has read Doggett as
allowing a prejudice requirement but imposing a separate bal-
ancing test for the prejudice factor alone.5' Other courts have
similarly adopted idiosyncratic interpretations of the case.52
Doggett has therefore not provided much guidance as to how to
weigh the Barker factors.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL INTERESTS AT STAKE IN SPEEDY TRIAL
JURISPRUDENCE
Constitutional speedy trial jurisprudence consisted of inter-
est balancing long before Barker. We should therefore not look to
the Barker test alone for solutions to the underlying Sixth
Amendment problem that Barker attempted to solve. Rather, it is
necessary to examine the interests that have guided the past
49 112 S Ct at 2693. In assessing this element, the Court stated that prosecutorial
negligence clearly "falls on the wrong side of the divide between acceptable and unaccept-
able reasons for delaying a criminal prosecution.. . ." Id. The lower court had stated that
only "bad faith or a dilatory purpose" can cause the reason for delay factor to weigh
heavily against the government. Doggett, 906 F2d at 578.
See United States v Shell, 974 F2d 1035, 1036 (9th Cir 1992).
5' See United States v Shelton, 820 F Supp 461, 466-67 (W D Mo 1992).
52 See, for example, United States v Vassell, 970 F2d 1162, 1165 (2d Cir 1992), cert
denied as Moore v United States, 113 S Ct 627 (1992) (citing Doggett for the proposition
that the need to show actual prejudice varies inversely with the length of delay); Hakeem
v Beyer, 990 F2d 750, 763 (3rd Cir 1993) (interpreting Doggett to mean that presumptive
prejudice, as distinct from "particularized prejudice," increases with the length of delay);
United States v Anagnostou, 974 F2d 939, 942 n 1 (7th Cir 1992), cert denied, 113 S Ct
1943 (1993) (reading Doggett to mean that prosecutorial negligence, as distinct from bad
faith, weighs against the government only in cases where the delay is extremely long).
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century of speedy trial decisions and that the Barker test was
designed to serve.
A. Constitutionally Recognized Interests
Perhaps the most widely accepted premise of speedy trial law
is that both society and accused individuals have meaningful and
meaningfully different stakes in the speed with which criminal
cases are brought to trial.53 The Barker Court, for instance, sug-
gested that societal interests exist "separate from, and at times
in opposition to, the interests of the accused."' While some
scholars criticize this distinction on the grounds that all Bill of
Rights guarantees, as personal guarantees, are in conflict to some
degree with societal interests,55 none deny that the conflict ex-
ists, or that courts take account of it. The conflict therefore bears
closer examination.
1. Individual interests.
In the debate over how to interpret the speedy trial guaran-
tee, courts and scholars often juxtapose the defendant's and
society's interest in a speedy trial. The Sixth Amendment, howev-
er, is not a safeguard for such strategic interests, but rather for
constitutional interests. Criminal defendants have three distinct
constitutional interests in receiving a speedy trial: preventing
oppressive pretrial incarceration, minimizing public obloquy, and
preventing prejudice against the defendant at trial." When
these interests are shortchanged by delay, the Sixth Amendment
is violated, notwithstanding any strategic advantage the defen-
dant may gain.
The defendant's first interest in the right to a speedy trial is
avoiding undue and oppressive pretrial incarceration.57 Just as
protecting political speech is sometimes thought to be at the
"core" of the First Amendment, preventing government abuse of
the power of imprisonment is often thought to be -at the core of
See, for example, Beavers, 198 US at 87 (noting the speedy trial right secures
rights of a defendant, but does not preclude the rights of public justice); Barker, 407 US at
519-22; Dickey v Florida, 398 US 30, 42-43 (1970) (Brennan concurring) (stating that
"Ijiust as a delay may impair the ability of the accused to defend himself, so it may reduce
the capacity of the government to prove its case").
Barker, 407 US at 519.
5 See, for example, Garcia, The Sixth Amendment at 157 (cited in note 4).
56 See Barker, 407 US at 532.
17 See id; Dickey, 398 US at 41, citing Ewell, 383 US at 120.
[61:587
A New Speedy Trial Standard
the speedy trial guarantee. The Sixth Amendment was adopted
against a backdrop of English and early colonial practice in
which criminal prosecutions had been conducted with "unfair-
ness," "brutality," and the "savage satisfaction" of the courts in
their oft-exercised power of life and death over criminal defen-
dants.58
The defendant's second interest in the speedy trial right lies
in the reduction of anxiety and concern accompanying public
accusation. As the Supreme Court noted in United States v
Marion, the "public obloquy" and "anxiety" accompanying an
arrest or indictment implicate Sixth Amendment concerns just as
surely as incarceration does:
[T]he major evils protected against by the speedy trial guar-
antee exist quite apart from actual or possible prejudice to
an accused's defense. To legally arrest and detain, the Gov-
ernment must assert probable cause to believe the arrestee
has committed a crime. Arrest is a public act that may seri-
ously interfere with the defendant's liberty, whether he is
free on bail or not, and that may disrupt his employment,
drain his financial resources, curtail his associations, subject
him to public obloquy, and create anxiety in him, his family
and his friends.59
The third individual interest lies in preserving the accused's
ability to defend against pending criminal charges.60 Although
this interest was not as central to the original understanding of
the Sixth Amendment as the interest in preventing oppressive
incarceration,6 modern judicial opinions have accorded it the
most attention. Trial prejudice, according to the Court in Doggett,
is the paramount interest protected by the speedy trial guaran-
' Heller, The Sixth Amendment at 13 (cited in note 10).
9 404 US 307, 320 (1971). In recognizing this interest, the Marion Court relied on a
similar expression of concern over the possibility of personal anxiety and public ostracism
in Kiopfer v North Carolina, 386 US 213 (1967). The Klopfer Court had held that a pro-
fessor at Duke University charged with criminal trespass stated a valid claim for speedy
trial relief even though he had not been incarcerated during the pendency of his indict-
ment. Id at 221-22.
' See Ewell, 383 US at 120 (stating that the speedy trial right serves to "limit the
possibilities that long delay will impair the ability of an accused to defend himself").
" The strongest evidence that trial prejudice was not the most central concern of the
speedy trial guarantee is the Supreme Court's statement one year before Barker that "the
major evils protected against by the speedy trial guarantee exist quite apart from actual
or possible prejudice to an accused's defense." Marion, 404 US at 320.
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tee-more serious, the Court implied, than either oppressive
pretrial incarceration or public scorn.2
2. Societal interests.
Society also has three distinct interests in ensuring that
defendants receive a speedy trial. The first interest is in the
effective prosecution of criminal cases.6" Given that prosecutors
often benefit from trial delays-especially in complex, multi-de-
fendant actions--one might view a speedy trial as anathema to
effective prosecution. Yet "effective prosecution" does not consist
of convicting all defendants through any means possible. Rather,
"[t]he Speedy Trial Clause [ I serves the public interest by penal-
izing official abuse of the criminal process and discouraging offi-
cial lawlessness." 5 "Effective prosecution" thus requires that the
state pursue criminal indictments vigorously and swiftly within
the context of a fair judicial system.66 This is not to say that
society can never have a constitutionally cognizable interest in
trial delay; the Supreme Court has never suggested that delay
while the prosecution gathers evidence or while a co-conspirat6r
is prosecuted would violate the Sixth Amendment. Nonetheless,
as Justice Brennan explained in Dickey v Florida, society's Sixth
2 Six justices in Doggett endorsed the proposition that preventing unfair prejudice to
an accused's ability to present a defense is "the most serious" individual interest protected
by the speedy trial guarantee. 112 S Ct at 2692, quoting Barker, 407 US at 532. Note that
trial prejudice is not synonymous with the prejudice element of the Barker test. Rather, it
is one of the interests (along with oppressive pretrial incarceration, and undue anxiety
and concern of the accused) meant to be captured by the prejudice element of the Barker
test.
Justice Thomas, joined by two other Justices, questioned whether preventing trial
prejudice could legitimately be understood as an aim of the Sixth Amendment. 112 S Ct
at 2695-97 (Thomas dissenting). Thomas suggested that there are two conflicting lines of
authority regarding the individual interests protected by the speedy trial guarantee. One
line, culminating in the language of Barker, recognizes trial prejudice as a concern within
the purview of the Sixth Amendment. See Barker, 407 US at 532; Smith v Hooey, 393 US
374, 377-78 (1969); Ewell, 383 US at 120. The second line recognizes only incursions into
defendants' liberty as justifications for speedy trial relief. See Marion, 404 US at 321-22;
United States v Loud Hawk, 474 US 302, 312 (1986). Thomas rejected the former line of
authority but endorsed the latter. Doggett, 112 S Ct at 2697 (Thomas dissenting).
See Dickey, 398 US at 42 (Brennan concurring).
In Barker, for instance, prosecutors waited to try Barker until they obtained the
conviction of his accomplice. The accomplice's testimony was considered essential to the
prosecution's case against Barker. 407 US at 516.
Dickey, 398 US at 43 (Brennan concurring).
See id (noting that the right to a speedy trial protects society's interest in prosecut-
ing-not persecuting-the accused).
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Amendment interest is and should be aligned with speedier tri-
als. 7
Second, society has an interest in preventing an accused who
is not incarcerated from committing additional criminal acts
while awaiting trial.' Speedy trial claims may arise when de-
fendants are free as well as when they languish in jail. For ex-
ample, the defendant in Doggett was free for the eight and a half
years between the time of his indictment and his trial.69 The
government's negligence in pursuing Doggett thwarted society's
legitimate interest in bringing drug dealers to justice, and left
open the possibility that this particular defendant could have
continued dealing and smuggling drugs for the entire period of
his extended trial delay.7 °
Society's third speedy trial interest lies in reducing the wast-
ed cost of pretrial incarceration for defendants who will ultimate-
ly be acquitted. Not only does society pay the actual costs of
incarceration, but society also loses the benefit of an additional
tax-paying wage earner v.7 Some defendants whose trials are un-
constitutionally delayed are likely to be found innocent. Society
thus has a purely economic interest, quite apart from its meta-
physical interests in justice, in seeing that these defendants are
tried and released as quickly as possible.
This Section has described the constitutionally significant
interests of individual criminal defendants on the one hand and
those of society on the other. Implicit in this description is the
idea that the Sixth Amendment does not recognize the more pe-
destrian consideration of which party will prevail in a particular
case. The fact that a delayed trial may increase the probability of
a conviction does not necessarily further any constitutionally
recognized societal interest. Similarly, even if trial delays im-
prove a defendant's chances of acquittal, the defendant's consti-
tutional interests would nonetheless be harmed. Neither society
nor the criminal defendant has a constitutionally protected in-
Id at 42.
6 Id.
6 Doggett, 112 S Ct at 2689-90.
"' In fact, Doggett was living "a normal, productive, and law-abiding life" by the time
he was finally brought to trial. At that point, the former drug smuggler had married,
earned an associate's degree at college, obtained employment, bought two houses, filed
income tax returns, registered to vote, and never attempted to conceal his identity or
whereabouts. See Doggett, 906 F2d at 577.
71 See Barker, 407 US at 520-21. Society must also often support the dependents of
the accused as well. Id at 521.
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terest in winning a given case; what each has are the very partic-
ular interests specified above.
B. Sub-Constitutional Interests
Notwithstanding the idea that neither society nor the ac-
cused defendant has a constitutional interest in a delayed trial, it
is still a basic premise of speedy trial jurisprudence that either
might have a non-constitutional, strategic interest in such a
delay. Depending on the circumstances, either the prosecutor or
the defendant may stand to benefit from trial delay.
Often, delay strengthens the prosecution's case.72 The pros-
pects of developing additional testimony, encouraging plea bar-
gains, negotiating grants of immunity, or convicting co-conspira-
tors all encourage prosecutors to delay trials. Additionally, in an
age when prosecutorial resources are stretched to their limit,
delays reduce the need to prioritize among pending cases. 3
Like prosecutors, defendants can also have strong incentives
to delay trials.74 A defendant's most obvious interest in trial de-
lay arises when the trial is highly publicized or politically
charged. In such a case, the defendant might want to wait to be
tried until tempers have calmed and publicity has faded. 5 De-
fendants might also want to delay in the hope that prosecution
witnesses will forget enough details to create the reasonable
doubt needed for acquittal.
Barker implicitly recognizes these incentives for delay and
can be applied to counter them in several ways. First, the Barker
test includes an inquiry as to whether, and when, the defendant
seeking dismissal of the charges against him has invoked his
2 That is vividly illustrated by repeated assertions that the Sixth Amendment allows
for greater delay in complex conspiracy cases than it does in simpler cases. See, for
example, Barker, 407 US at 531 ("The delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street
crime is considerably less than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.").
" In drug prosecutions, for example, it may be so difficult for the government to lo-
cate particular defendants that prosecutors are simply better off prosecuting those defen-
dants they happen to locate and waiting until others show up before prosecuting them.
This is so even when the missing defendants are not purposely evading law enforcement
authorities. See, for example, Doggett, 112 S Ct 2686.
" This claim has practically become a mantra for those who support a narrow read-
ing of the speedy trial guarantee. In the pre-Barker cases, courts advocating the "demand-
waiver" rule often invoked this proposition in assuming that delay benefits a defendant.
See Barker, 407 US at 524-26.
7' Defendants in these cases might have a constitutional interest in delay under the
impartial jury clause of the Sixth Amendment. However, the speedy trial right includes
no such constitutional interest.
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speedy trial right. 6 Second, courts that apply the weighted bal-
ancing version of Barker use the test's fourth prong-prejudice to
the defendant-to preserve the government's ability to prosecute
long-delayed cases when the delay has not prejudiced the defen-
dant.
Unfortunately, the Barker test can just as well be used to
reinforce these strategic interests as to counteract them. For
example, under the weighted balancing test, prosecutors can
benefit from trial delays as long as they do not prejudice the
defendant.77 However, the Sixth Amendment's speedy trial guar-
antee only protects the procedural fairness of a trial-not either
side's interest in winning. Yet without a coherent interpretation
of Barker, the Barker test can be read to respect strategic incen-
tives (which may lead to trial delays) that conflict with constitu-
tional interests (which may not).
C. "Severe" Remedies
Not only do current speedy trial doctrines grant relief infre-
quently, they may also grant relief in the wrong circumstances.
Based on a rigorous analysis of the policies underlying the
speedy trial right, one can construct an interpretation of the
Barker test that results in relief when delay contravenes these
policies and denies relief in other cases. This task is especially
important because of the nature of the remedy for speedy trial
violations.
Only one remedy can cure a speedy trial violation: dismissal
with prejudice.78 The dismissal requirement, like so many other
elements of speedy trial law, is rooted in the fundamental judi-
cial belief that the speedy trial right is different from other crimi-
nal procedural rights. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court
in Strunk v United States, stressed that a speedy trial violation,
unlike, for example, the failure to afford a public trial or an im-
76 This inquiry comprises the third prong of the Barker test. 407 US at 531. Federal
courts have often been ruthless in their consideration of the defendant's assertion of his
speedy trial right. The appellate court in Barker, for example, affirmed the defendant's
conviction solely because he had waited too long to assert his right. Barker, 442 F2d 1141
(6th Cir 1971). And in one Fifth Circuit case, the court held that although the defendant's
eight-year delay was "presumptively prejudicial," he nonetheless did not state a claim for
relief largely because he had failed to assert his speedy trial claim until eight years after
indictment. Bell v Lynaugh, 828 F2d 1085, 1094 (5th Cir 1987).
77 See text accompanying notes 39-46.
78 See Strunk v United States, 412 US 434, 440 (1973), citing Barker, 407 US at 522.
1994]
602 The University of Chicago Law Review [61:587
partial jury, cannot be corrected by granting a new trial.79 Thus,
although dismissal "is more serious than an exclusionary rule or
a reversal for a new trial[,] ... it is the only possible remedy."0
Because this remedy is absolute, courts tend to apply the
speedy trial right reluctantly." Courts often seem to avoid the
"unsatisfactorily severe remedy of dismissal."2 Other courts
have pointed to the strict remedy as justification for requiring
that the defendant show actual prejudice." While this Comment
argues that the Barker test should be interpreted in a way that
recognizes the vitality of the speedy trial right as a protection for
criminal defendants, any standard that furthers such an inter-
pretation must take into account the extreme remedy that the
Supreme Court has mandated for all speedy trial violations.
IV. THE ADVANTAGES OF A MOTIVE TEST
A. A Lesson from the Speedy Trial Act
The Barker test can only be effective to the extent that it
protects constitutional speedy trial interests and minimizes stra-
tegic incentives for delay. Recall that both prosecutors and defen-
dants have interests in speedy trials and interests in delay, but
the Sixth Amendment only grants constitutional status to inter-
ests associated with speedy trials. An effective interpretation of
Barker v Wingo, therefore, must promote speedy trial interests
without promoting other merely strategic interests.
Judicial interpretations of the Speedy Trial Act' reveal that
speedy trial interests can be effectively separated from delay
incentives. Congress intended the Speedy Trial Act to compen-
sate for the "ill-defined constitutional criteria" of the speedy trial
guarantee, 5 as well as to give greater substance to the societal
79 Strunk, 412 US at 438-39.
" Barker, 407 US at 522.
', See, for example, United States v Jones, 524 F2d 834, 852 (DC Cir 1975) (express-
ing reluctance to apply such a "draconian remedy"); State v Alfred, 337 S2d 1049, 1057
(La 1976) (refusing to apply dismissal remedy "overzealous[ly]"). See also Joseph, 48
Fordham L Rev at 619 (cited in note 9).
' See, for example, Hill v Wainwright, 617 F2d 375, 377 (5th Cir 1980). The Hill
court cited Barker for the proposition that dismissal was an "unsatisfactorily severe"
remedy, but left out the next sentence of Barker, where the Supreme Court stated that "it
is the only possible remedy." See Barker, 407 US at 522.
' See, for example, Ringstaff v Howard, 885 F2d 1542, 1544-45 (11th Cir 1989) (en
banc).
Speedy Trial Act of 1974, Pub L No 93-619, 88 Stat 2076, codified at 18 USC §§
3161-74 (1988 & Supp 1992).
'5 Garcia, The Sixth Amendment at 174 (cited in note 4). See also Speedy Trial Act,
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interest in speedy trials.86 The underlying purposes of the
Speedy Trial Act are so similar to those underlying the Sixth
Amendment that at least one scholar has argued that the consti-
tutional ends of the Sixth Amendment can best be achieved
through statutory remedies." The reason for such a recommen-
dation is that the criteria for framing a successful Speedy Trial
Act claim are much clearer than the Barker criteria, which, as we
have seen, are applied inconsistently throughout the federal
courts." Perhaps, then, a glimpse at the statutory speedy trial
standard can provide insight as to what kind of standard would
best bring a uniform interpretation to the Barker test in the
constitutional context.
In a recent Speedy Trial Act decision, the Tenth Circuit pro-
vided a fairly dramatic picture of how courts separate the inter-
ests protected by the speedy trial right from the incentives that
may lead one party or the other to seek trial delay:
The Government contends that [the defendant] knowingly
waived his right to a speedy indictment. This contention
fallaciously assumes a defendant has the authority to waive
the speedy indictment provision. The right to a speedy in-
dictment belongs to both the defendant and society. There-
fore, provisions of the Speedy Trial Act cannot be waived by
a defendant acting unilaterally because it would compromise
the public interest in speedy justice.89
This application of the Speedy Trial Act demonstrates one way to
create positive incentives for prosecutors to bring cases to trial
quickly and vindicate defendants' constitutional interests in
speedy trials.' In theory, the courts respect speedy trial inter-
HR Rep No 93-1508, 93d Cong, 2d Sess, reprinted in 1974 USCCAN 7401, 7402 (noting
the Act was intended to "give effect to the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial");
United States v Mehrmanesh, 652 F2d 766, 769 (9th Cir 1980) (noting the Speedy Trial
Act was passed partly because Congress was dissatisfied with Barker).
" See 1974 USCCAN at 7402 (noting the purpose of the Act is to reduce crime and
the danger of recidivism).
See Joseph, 48 Fordham L Rev at 647-48 (cited in note 9).
Joseph suggests that the constitutional speedy trial right is lost in the "fact-laden
morass" of judicially created constitutional doctrine. Id at 648.
8" United States v Saltzman, 984 F2d 1087, 1091 (10th Cir 1993) (citations omitted),
cert denied, 113 S Ct 2940 (1993). The federal Speedy Trial Act may at first seem an
inapposite example because it was adopted for the express purpose of vindicating societal
speedy trial interests, while the Sixth Amendment is often thought to confer rights on
individuals. But as discussed, the Supreme Court has consistently interpreted the Sixth
Amendment speedy trial guarantee as protecting both individual and societal interests.
' Of course, because the Speedy Trial Act applies only to federal prosecutions, see
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ests while declining to recognize interests in delay. For example,
prosecutors must bring cases quickly, despite any delay tactics by
defendants, or have their cases dismissed. The question remains
whether a similar approach could work within the limits of the
Barker test.
B. Shortcomings of Existing Approaches
The federal courts have applied two basic interpretations of
Barker: the straight balancing test and the weighted balancing
test. Neither effectively vindicates the constitutional interests at
stake, and both are vulnerable to manipulation that favors stra-
tegic interests-interests that arguably have no place in speedy
trial analysis. This Section proposes a new legal standard in
order to address these problems better.
1. The straight balancing approach.
In effect, the straight balancing test treats each of the Bar-
ker factors as a proxy for one or more of the underlying interests
protected by the Sixth Amendment.9' In so doing, this test can
vindicate the constitutional interests of criminal defendants.
Still, flaws remain. First, it does not treat the threat of prejudice
as seriously as does the weighted test. Prejudice to an accused
person's defense is at the core of the speedy trial guarantee, 2
and because the straight balancing test weighs prejudice in the
same manner as the other interests at stake, it may not give
enough weight to this crucial factor. But since this approach at
least occasionally results in relief for speedy trial petitioners,"
it may better serve the other two constitutional interests of de-
fendants, namely, preventing undue incarceration and reducing
the public scorn that accompanies an indictment. Moreover, it
may be that because the straight balancing test results in relief
more frequently than the weighted test,94 the former test is in
United States v Mills, 964 F2d 1186, 1188-89 (DC Cir 1992) (en banc), cert denied, 113 S
Ct 471 (1992), even the most liberal interpretation of the Act will not help defendants in
state prosecutions, though states often have their own statutory remedies.
"' See Barker, 407 US at 530-33 (discussing the underlying policies justifying each of
the factors in the balancing test).
See Doggett, 112 S Ct at 2692.
See, for example, United States v Shelton, 820 F Supp 461 (W D Mo 1992); United
States v Zabady, 546 F Supp 35 (M D Pa 1982); Moore v De Young, 391 F Supp 111 (D NJ
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 515 F2d 437 (3rd Cir 1975).
Only once has a "weighted" circuit (the Fifth or Eleventh) dismissed an indictment
on constitutional speedy trial grounds since Barker. See Prince v Alabama, 507 F2d 693
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practice actually more advantageous to defendants whose main
concern is trial prejudice.
The greatest drawback to the straight balancing test is that
it manages defense and prosecutorial incentives for delay in an
undesirably contingent way. The prosecutor's incentive to bring a
case to trial quickly will vary according to the defendant's behav-
ior. The fact that the third Barker element (the defendant's as-
sertion of the right) is accorded as much weight as the fourth
element (actual prejudice) strengthens the defendant's incentive
to request a speedy trial at the earliest opportunity and minimiz-
es his incentives for strategic behavior. But the longer the defen-
dant waits to request a speedy trial (for example, to wait for
adverse publicity to die down, to finish gathering exculpatory evi-
dence, or even because the defendant is unaware that charges
are pending at all), the longer the prosecutor can delay the trial
with impunity. The likelihood that the case will be dismissed on
speedy trial grounds varies directly with the speed with which
the defendant asserts his Sixth Amendment rights.
2. The weighted balancing test.
The weighted balancing test uses the first Barker ele-
ment-the length of trial delay-as a "triggering mechanism";
only if the delay is long enough will the court inquire into the
other three factors." The length of delay required to trigger a
Sixth Amendment inquiry depends on the nature of the prosecu-
tion. In general, trial must be delayed for at least eight
months. 6 If the length of delay element is satisfied, courts then
analyze the reason for the delay, whether the defendant asserted
the Sixth Amendment right at the earliest available opportunity,
and the degree of actual prejudice suffered as a result of the de-
lay.97 The actual prejudice inquiry, however, receives special
attention. Actual prejudice is required for a successful speedy tri-
al claim unless all three other Barker elements are shown to
"weigh[ I heavily against the government.""
(5th Cir 1975).
' Ringstaff, 885 F2d at 1543. In Barker, the Supreme Court stated that the length of
delay element is only "to some extent" a triggering mechanism. 407 US at 530.
" See Joseph, 48 Fordham L Rev at 623 n 71 (cited in note 9) (collecting cases).
17 See, for example, Ringstaff, 885 F2d at 1543.
" United States v Mitchell, 769 F2d 1544, 1547 (11th Cir 1985), citing United States v
Dennard, 722 F2d 1510, 1513 (11th Cir 1984).
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The weighted balancing approach differs from the straight
approach in two important respects: first, the length-of-delay ele-
ment of Barker is treated as a triggering mechanism;99 and sec-
ond, a criminal defendant does not stand a reasonable chance of
winning speedy trial relief unless he shows actual prejudice.'"
Thus understood, the straight balancing test tends to grant relief
more liberally than its weighted-balancing cousin. For example,
in a case where the trial was long delayed but not outrageously
so, the reason for delay was prosecutorial negligence (which
weighs less heavily against the government than actual miscon-
ductl"l), the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial at the
first moment he learned of his accusation, and no actual preju-
dice was shown may conceivably result in relief under the
straight balancing test, whereas it may not under the weighted
approach.
The weighted balancing approach does not adequately serve
the constitutional interests Barker aims to protect. Admittedly,
the weighted approach appears highly protective of the
defendant's ability to defend himself; trial prejudice forms the.
core of the weighted approach.0 2 In practice, however, the
weighted balancing test almost never results in speedy trial relief
for even the most egregious delays.0 3 No matter how long the
trial delay, a defendant will never obtain relief without a show-
ing of prejudice unless he can show that both of the other two
Barker factors weigh heavily against the government, a re-
quirement that is almost never met in the reported cases. Thus,
the weighted balancing test does not really protect the
defendant's interest in preventing undue and oppressive incarcer-
ation. By the same token, the test fails to take into account the
defendant's interest in reducing the public obloquy accompanying
' See, for example, United States v Vassell, 970 F2d 1162, 1164 (2d Cir 1992) (re-
fusing to consider the remaining Barker factors unless the length of delay is "presump-
tively prejudicial"); United States v Blanco, 861 F2d 773, 777 (2d Cir 1988) (using length
of delay as a trigger, then balancing the remaining factors); Rayborn v Scully, 858 F2d 84,
89 (2d Cir 1988) (same).
100 See cases cited in note 103.
.01 See Doggett, 112 S Ct at 2693.
"o For example, under the weighted approach, as long as the triggering length of
delay was satisfied, a defendant who both failed to invoke his speedy trial right and who
was unable to show prosecutorial misconduct could still receive relief if he suffered
prejudice to his defense.
103 See, for example, Bell v Lynaugh, 828 F2d 1085 (5th Cir 1987) (relief denied for an
eight-year delay); Hill v Wainwright, 617 F2d 375 (5th Cir 1980) (relief denied for a three-
year delay); Ringstaff, 885 F2d 1542 (relief denied for a 23-month delay).
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criminal accusation, because the length of delay factor is almost
never determinative.
With regard to society's speedy trial interests, the weighted
approach only protects society's interest in effective prosecution.
Even then, the weighted approach only serves this interest be-
cause the prosecutor's interest in winning trials is closely aligned
to society's interest in putting offenders behind bars. When delay
does not hamper a prosecutor's potential for trial success, how-
ever, the weighted approach leaves society's interests in prevent-
ing recidivism unprotected because the prosecutor can either
strategically delay or simply neglect to prosecute, without fear of
dismissal. In such a case-where, for example, the prosecution
simply seeks to harass the defendant-the link between the
prosecutor's interest in winning the trial and society's interest in
quickly incarcerating criminals is severed. Additionally, when the
defendant is incarcerated for the period of delay, society has to
spend public resources on the incarceration of possibly innocent
defendants.
Finally, the weighted balancing test creates a set of incen-
tives running in favor of trial delay rather than speedy prosecu-
tion. On the one hand, the weighted approach provides no reward
to the defendant who vigorously asserts his right to a speedy
trial. The only element that effectively counts under the weighted
test is actual prejudice, so defendants who have a present incen-
tive to delay will wait to assert their speedy trial right until they
have suffered actual prejudice. Because the weighted balancing
test does not give any exaggerated weight to whether the defen-
dant has asserted his right, a defendant can try to beat the sys-
tem in two ways: first, by failing to assert his speedy trial right
during the time he perceives a speedy trial to be detrimental to
his ability to win at trial; and second, by moving for dismissal as
soon as he suffers actual prejudice. The defendant's constitution-
ally protected interests-such as preventing undue incarceration
and public obloquy-thus become subjugated to his strategic
interest in improving his odds at trial.
Nor does the weighted approach provide any incentive for the
prosecutor to seek a speedy trial. Because courts view the reason
for delay as less important than actual prejudice, the strategic
prosecutor can "punish" the recalcitrant defendant by moving for
multiple continuances that will likely be granted as long as the
prosecutor can show that the defendant's ability, say, to produce
key witnesses, is intact. Society's interests in speedy justice thus
become secondary to the prosecutor's interest in trial delay.
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In sum, both the "straight" and the "weighted" interpreta-
tions of Barker leave many of the concerns underlying the speedy
trial right unaddressed. At the same time, these interpretations
serve other interests that are irrelevant, even counterproductive,
for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment. Both approaches
should be abandoned in favor of the motive test suggested by this
Comment.
C. A New Approach: The Motive Test
The interests underlying the Sixth Amendment would be
best served if courts adopted a balancing test that placed extra
weight on the reason for delay rather than prejudice. As under
the existing weighted balancing test, length of delay should op-
erate as a triggering mechanism. Under this test, relief would be
granted in each of two circumstances: first, when the reason-for-
delay factor is found to weigh heavily against the govern-
ment,0 4 or second, when the defendant's assertion of the right
and actual prejudice both weigh heavily against the government.
Because of the focus on the reason for delay, this approach
can be labelled the "motive" test. The "motive" label does not
imply a free-ranging judicial inquiry into the psychological moti-
vations driving either prosecutors' or defendants' litigation be-
havior. Such an inquiry would certainly be costly, if not fruitless.
The motive test has its roots in concurring opinions in the
speedy trial decisions United States v Ewell,' Dickey v Flori-
da,10 6 and United States v Marion.' In Ewell, Justice
Brennan rejected the Court's ad hoc balancing of interests as
"approval of a course of government conduct" that he found "most
oppressive."' Justice Brennan felt that even though the facts
of the case showed no prejudice at all, the Court should not adopt
any legal test that appeared to endorse prosecutorial coercion or
harassment.' 9 In Dickey, Justice Brennan underscored the idea
14 For the reason for delay to weigh heavily against the government, a defendant
must show actual prosecutorial bad faith or misconduct and not mere negligence. A clear
showing of governmental negligence counts in a defendant's favor to an important but
lesser extent. See Doggett, 112 S Ct at 2693.
"' 383 US 116, 125-26 (1966) (Brennan concurring).
398 US 30, 43 (1970) (Brennan concurring).
107 404 US 307, 334 (1971) (Douglas concurring).
108 Ewell, 383 US 116 at 125 (Brennan concurring).
o Id at 126. Brennan did not distinguish in his concurring opinion between the
defendant-appellees' speedy trial and due process claims, but his reasoning applies
equally well to both claims.
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that "deliberate governmental delay" is one of the most signifi-
cant dangers addressed by the Sixth Amendment-so significant,
in fact, that Brennan characterized the prevention of such gov-
ernmental misconduct not as an individual defendant's interest
but as a "common interest."" ° Finally, in Marion, Justice Doug-
las cited Justice Brennan's Dickey opinion for the proposition
that the length of delay tolerable in a particular case depends
largely on the reason for the delay."'
The motive test better protects defendants' speedy trial inter-
ests than does the weighted test because the motive test prevents
prosecutors from oppressively incarcerating defendants when the
delay has no prejudicial effect. The motive test is thus similar to
the straight balancing test in that it does not require that all
three other Barker factors weigh heavily against the government.
The innovation of the motive test is essentially that a showing of
improper governmental motive is deemed sufficient-not neces-
sary-to establish a speedy trial claim.
The motive test also strongly protects society's speedy trial
interests. Society's interest in reducing recidivism can only be
protected by a speedy trial test that provides an incentive for
prosecutorial diligence and good faith. Because the motive test
would grant relief more frequently than the weighted balancing
test, the motve test furthers society's interests in reducing recidi-
vism by defendants awaiting trial and in reducing expenditures
wasted while preventing the unwarranted losses associated with
innocent defendants. Nor does the motive test hinder society's
ability to prosecute effectively, because the test only results in
the dismissal of cases in which delay is attributable to prosecuto-
rial bad faith, misconduct, or gross negligence."' Unlike the
straight balancing test, the motive test will usually not call for
the dismissal of a fair prosecution." 3
The motive test also manages the defense and prosecutorial
incentives for delay more productively. The motive test reduces a
defendant's incentive to delay assertion of the speedy trial right.
When the state has not acted out of an improper motive, early
"1 Dickey, 398 US at 43 (Brennan concurring).
. Marion, 404 US at 334 (Douglas concurring).
12 Recall that the government's repeated failure to apprehend Doggett was character-
ized as negligent. Doggett, 112 S Ct at 2691.
" One might fear such an occurrence under the straight balancing test because a
very small showing of government negligence, together with a delay of moderate length,
an early assertion by the defendant of his speedy trial right, and a small amount of
prejudice could conceivably result in dismissal.
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assertion will count in the defendant's favor; conversely, when
the government has acted improperly, the defendant gains noth-
ing by seeking delay of his trial (for his chances of gaining dis-
missal are already strong). Under the weighted balancing test,
defendants have an incentive to delay because the degree of actu-
al prejudice increases as time passes. Eventually the prejudice
requirement becomes self-actuating, and the strategic defendant
receives a windfall in the form of dismissal.
At the same time, the motive test forces the government to
prosecute with reasonable speed irrespective of any action taken
by the defendant. The motive test is thus superior to the weight-
ed balancing approach because the prosecution cannot oppress or
coerce defendants by delaying their trials to the point of actual
prejudice. So doing would cause the reason for delay to weigh
heavily against the government. Further, the motive test sepa-
rates the prosecution's incentives from the defendant's behavior,
so that the speed with which the prosecution brings a case to
trial no longer depends on the speed with which the defendant
asserts his speedy trial rights. If a defendant shows that a prose-
cutor engaged in such strategic behavior, the defendant would
state a good claim for dismissal under the motive test. The mo-
tive test, in other words, provides an independent incentive for
the prosecutor to proceed with reasonable speed.
Two applications of the motive test provide a clearer view of
its operation. In United States v Lustman, a case with a common
speedy trial fact pattern, the Second Circuit denied relief under
something like the straight balancing test."' Lustman was in-
dicted for mail fraud, but he was not tried on the charges for
more than five years. Lustman caused one and a half years of the
delay by making multiple motions for continuances and by sub-
mitting more information to the prosecutor in hopes the prosecu-
tion would drop the case. While the remaining four years were
caused by "undue" neglect on the prosecutor's part, the defendant
did not make any speedy trial motion until the entire five-and-a-
half-year period had elapsed."' Further, Lustman had not
shown that the delay had impaired his ability to defend.
Because only the length of the delay weighed heavily against
the government, a straight balancing test would (and did) come
out against the defendant. The motive test, however, would focus
on the fact that four years of trial delay were attributable to
114 258 F2d 475 (2d Cir 1958).
5 Id at 477.
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nothing more than the government's negligence and would ac-
cordingly result in dismissal. The fact that Lustman was free for
the entire period of delay-rendering him able to commit further
crimes-underscores the need to spur quicker prosecution in
cases like his.
The motive test will not, of course, result in relief for all
speedy trial petitioners-nor should it. The motive test is de-
signed to provide relief in the right cases, not just in more cases.
A second and equally common set of facts appeared in Bell v
Lynaugh, where the Fifth Circuit denied relief under the weight-
ed balancing test."' Bell's trial was delayed for eight years. The
entire delay, however, was due to the defendant's own desire to
postpone trial on one charge until all avenues of appeal from
conviction for another charge had been exhausted. Bell did not
make a speedy trial motion until eight years had passed, and he
failed to demonstrate actual prejudice as a result of the delay.
The weighted balancing test therefore would (and did) deny re-
lief, since neither actual prejudice nor all three other Barker
factors weighed heavily against the government. The motive test
would also deny relief here because Bell's own behavior had
caused the entire delay.
CONCLUSION
The policy underpinnings of Barker v Wingo should be taken
seriously. While it is often said that the interests of defendants
diverge from the interests of society, there is one common thread:
speedier trials can protect both societal and individual interests.
Individual defendants and prosecutors may occasionally regard
their strategic interests as more closely aligned with delay than
with speed. The Sixth Amendment, however, does not protect
such interests. Recognizing this, the motive test offers a new
interpretation of Barker that gives both prosecutors and defen-
dants incentives to do what they can to speed the trial process
along.
116 828 F2d 1085, 1095 (5th Cir 1987).
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